Systematic Literature Review on the Anonymization of High Dimensional Streaming Datasets for Health Data Sharing  by Eze, Benjamin & Peyton, Liam
 Procedia Computer Science  63 ( 2015 )  348 – 355 
1877-0509 © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the Program Chairs
doi: 10.1016/j.procs.2015.08.353 
ScienceDirect
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
The 5th International Conference on Current and Future Trends of Information and 
Communication Technologies in Healthcare (ICTH 2015) 
Systematic Literature Review on the Anonymization of High 
Dimensional Streaming Datasets for Health Data Sharing 
Benjamin Ezea, Liam Peytona* 
aUniversity of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, K1N 6N5, Canada 
Abstract 
One of the biggest challenges to health data sharing is regulations that prohibit the transmission and distribution of Personal 
Health Information (PHI) even among collaborating organizations. This impedes research and reduces the utility of these 
datasets. Anonymization can address this issue by hiding PHI while maintaining the analytical utility of the data. Much research 
has focused on data that is static, independent and complete. Unfortunately, this is not typical of health data. Instead of static, 
independent tables, health data is in relational databases with multiple high-dimensional tables that are transactional and 
constantly changing. Data recipients usually receive multiple versions of the database over time. This study reviews literature on 
anonymization methodologies for large and fast changing high-dimensional datasets, especially health data. Relevant papers are 
analyzed, categorized and compared in terms of scope, and contributions. Finally, we used the extracted details from our analysis 
to outline possible research direction for developing a realistic anonymization framework for health data sharing. 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the Program Chairs. 
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1. Introduction 
Anonymization of datasets requires a thorough understanding of various risk models that simulate the behaviours 
of de-anonymization adversaries1. The complexity of high-dimensional data makes it a particularly hard problem in 
the data anonymization space. Applicable anonymization methodologies for such datasets are as complex as the 
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various attack scenarios they represent. Therefore the appropriate anonymization model needs to adapt to the diverse 
nature of these datasets.  This is especially important for health data. 
Most  anonymization techniques2–4 fail with high-dimensional health data because they try to group actors so they 
look similar to an adversary trying to re-identify them5. Exact equivalence that is required for such grouping results 
in excessive information loss, virtually wiping off the analytical utility of the dataset3. Another issue that comes up 
often is associated with the state of the dataset. Data sharing in a streaming model6 assumes that health data being 
shared is constantly changing. Privacy protection needs to be consistent even within such streaming models. You 
cannot suppress the attribute of an actor in one stream and reveal it with another. 
We conducted a systematic literature review to investigate, document and analyze research on anonymizing high 
dimensional streaming datasets, particularly as it relates to health data. The methodologies used for querying, 
filtering and selecting the relevant academic papers from various academic publication databases are documented. 
The selected papers are analyzed against their relevance to our defined research question. The results of this analysis 
are then documented and discussed. Information extracted from these papers is analyzed, categorized and compared 
in terms of scope, and contributions.  Finally, the extracted details from our analysis are used to outline possible 
research directions for developing a realistic anonymization framework for health data sharing. 
2. Background 
For health data, Personal Health Information (PHI) attributes are categorized under one of three categories: Direct 
Identifier attributes singularly identify an individual in the dataset. These attributes include names, and given 
identifiers like social insurance numbers, social security numbers and driver license identifiers7. Quasi Identifier 
attributes, on their own, cannot identify an individual7. However, when quasi-identifiers (QI) are combined, they 
behave like direct identifiers. Most re-identification efforts link QI values to publicly available data repositories to 
re-identify individuals in an anonymized dataset. Finally, Sensitive Attributes are not usually public data but are 
sensitive if associated with an individual. Procedure and drug codes, as well as disease conditions are some of the 
popular sensitive attributes in the healthcare domain.  
In this study, we only consider research efforts aimed at anonymizing quasi-identifiers and sensitive attributes. 
The target of anonymization is to ensure that both identifying and sensitive attributes are protected from a de-
anonymization adversary. There are three types of disclosures: identity, attribute and membership disclosures. 
Identity disclosure occurs when the record of an individual in a dataset is re-identifiable.  It is also called record 
linkage since a record in a dataset can be linked to the individual8. Attribute disclosure occurs when new information 
can be gained on sensitive attributes by an attacker or adversary. It is important to note that attribute disclosure is 
often a consequence of identity disclosure. Membership disclosure on the other hand is a probabilistic measure of the 
presence or absence of an individual in a dataset. This knowledge changes the behavior of an adversary towards de-
anonymization. Both identity and attribute disclosures are important in this study. 
Various research efforts are geared at creating privacy models to ensure proper anonymization of one or more 
target datasets. k-Anonymity is the most popular measure of anonymity. Introduced by Samarati and Sweeney7 in 
1998, it ensures that each record in a dataset has at least k-1 indistinguishable records. k-Anonymity protects against 
identity disclosure but cannot guarantee protection against attribute disclosure of sensitive attributes10,11. A re-
identification adversary can discover the values of sensitive attributes when their diversity is low after 
anonymization. Basically, even when an equivalence class satisfies k-anonymity, it may not satisfy l-diversity for the 
sensitive attributes if they are not diverse enough10,11. l-diversity protects against sensitive attribute disclosure by 
requiring every equivalence class to have at least l well-represented values for each sensitive attribute. t-
Closeness10,12 takes this a little further by requiring that the distribution of these sensitive attributes in each 
equivalence class be close to the distribution of these attributes in the entire dataset. Table linkage represents those 
scenarios where the adversary is able to infer the presence or absence of an individual’s record in a dataset or table. 
d-Presence is the privacy model that protects against such adversarial knowledge.  e-Differential privacy is the 
privacy model that focuses on how an adversary would change the probabilistic belief on the sensitivity information 
of a victim after accessing the published anonymized data. 
These four basic models form the basis for most anonymization algorithms and frameworks. Generalization is the 
most popular anonymization technique10,13 for satisfying k-Anonymity. However, real datasets tend to produce very 
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unique groups, making most of the equivalence classes or quasi-identifier groups non k-Anonymous. Anonymization 
processors usually require a generalization tree or generalization hierarchies13 for each quasi-identifier. These 
hierarchies then get combined to form a generalization lattice. It is usually necessary to search this lattice for an 
optimal generalization set for all quasi-identifiers that satisfy k-Anonymity and sensitive attributes satisfying l-
Diversity, while providing the least information loss and the greatest data utility. This process of finding the optimal 
solution from a generalization lattice is NP Hard. There are many algorithms for searching the lattice more 
efficiently for an optimal solution, notably among them are Samarati’s k-minimal generalization algorithm7, 
Sweeney’s Datafly14, Kirsten’s Incognito15,  El Emam’s Optimal Lattice Anonymization (OLA)2, and Flash from 
Kohlmayer et al.4. 
Most generalization algorithms use global recoding of attribute values. That means the same transformation is 
applied to each quasi-identifier value. However, there are efforts to develop algorithms that perform this action 
locally for each equivalence class through local recoding16,17. Local recoding increases data utility but also 
drastically increases the complexity of the generalization process. Data suppression is used to strike the balance 
between utility and availability. Equivalence classes whose sizes are less than k need to be suppressed to keep the 
entire dataset k-Anonymous. Suppression can be done at record or cell level. Record level suppression simply 
deletes those equivalence classes that are not k-Anonymous. Unfortunately, suppressing those records could be 
overly excessive. Cell level suppression on the other hand determines those QI values that make a tuple identifiable 
and removes them. When used appropriately, it provides the least information loss for anonymization. There are 
algorithms that use perturbation to supplement generalization instead of suppressing identifiable attributes. Usually 
applied to sensitive attributes, perturbation techniques either shuffle at-risk QI values and sensitive attributes or 
simply replace them with fake masks of the original.  
Finally, another major challenge to anonymization comes from the wide variety of datasets out there. Most 
healthcare databases do not contain single, independent tables. Instead, they are normalized transactional databases 
with patient identifying and sensitive attributes scattered in multiple tables. Data streams also present potential 
challenges to anonymization. For example, EMR and Patient Management (PM) databases see patient data growing 
with each visit to the hospital or clinic. Guo et al.18 and Cao et al.19 show that one of the most important 
characteristics of data streams is the rate of change, which is usually high, and in turn affects the statistical 
characteristics of the dataset. Periodic releases of anonymized data can potentially reveal identifiable as well as 
sensitive attributes over time, even though each release is individually anonymous.  
3. Problem Description 
For effective health data sharing, anonymization must support both the complexity of health data and frequency 
of change in complex transactional systems. This systematic literature review tries to answer the question – are there 
anonymization frameworks for high-dimensional streaming health data? 
3.1. Research Method 
In this paper we followed the guidelines for a systematic literature review in software engineering20,21. Our study 
is summarized in three stages: planning the review, conducting the review, and reporting the review. In planning the 
review, we explain how we formulated the search keywords. Conducting the review delves into details of where and 
how we searched for the keywords, and how the results were obtained and filtered. Finally, we present the results of 
the review by classifying and comparing our gathered knowledge. 
3.2. Search Terms and Research Databases 
Our search was for academic papers that present or discuss algorithms, methodology or application frameworks 
for anonymizing high-dimensional datasets. The search also includes work done on streaming datasets or 
incremental data releases where data is continuously published to the data recipients. 
The following terms are considered: anonymization plus synonyms like de-identification and antonyms like re-
identification; high-dimensional datasets plus synonyms like streams, streaming, longitudinal events and relational 
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databases; anonymization techniques like generalization, suppression, aggregation, and clustering.  We were 
interested in papers that present models, algorithms and application frameworks.  We also required that k-Anonymity 
or k-Anonymization be mentioned somewhere in the content.  These keywords were used to formulate advanced 
search queries that were run against some of the most popular academic databases: Google Scholar, Springer Link, 
Science Direct, PubMed, ACM Digital Library and IEEE Explore. 
3.3. Exclusion Criteria 
Papers that focus on these domains are excluded: anonymization techniques that solely apply to cross-sectional 
datasets with the exception of those that investigate clustering for sensitive attributes as well streaming databases or 
data streams; unstructured data anonymization; geo-location or positioning systems or trajectory based system; 
biomedical anonymization especially DNA database anonymization.  
4. Conducting the review 
In conducting the review, we started off constructing advanced queries that create the right filters for each of the 
academic databases based on search terms in section 3.2. Our final search queries, the electronic repositories of 
scholar studies, and the number of returned results are summarized above in Table 1.  Because of space limitation, 
we are only able to show the search queries for Science Direct and Google Scholar. However, the other databases 
were still considered in our analysis. 
Table 1. Advanced Search Queries 
Query Database #Results Selected 
(*anonymiz* AND *identification) AND (stream* OR relational OR (high 
AND multi AND dimensional) OR longitudinal) AND (generalization OR 
suppression OR aggregation OR clustering OR cluster) AND (model OR 
algorithm OR framework) 
Science Direct 592 18 
(anonymization AND *identification AND privacy) AND ("k-anonymization" 
or "k-anonymity" OR "k-anonymous") (relational OR datebase OR (high 
AND multi AND dimensional) OR longitudinal) AND (generalization OR 
suppression OR aggregation OR cluster*)  -dna –gis 
Google Scholar 582 21 
 
Initial review of the search results was done by reviewing the title, abstract, keywords and sometimes conclusions 
to determine if a paper meets the criteria described in section 3.3. For those selected, we then filtered them through 
the exclusion criteria before making the final selection for each database or repository. Finally, duplicate selections 
were excluded. At the end of this process, we ended up with 26 papers for data extraction. 
Based on the extracted data from each paper, we categorized the papers into three categories to cover our research 
domains:  
CAT1 – Improving high-dimensional data anonymization or datasets with many sensitive attributes.  
CAT2 – Improving cross-sectional data anonymization with many quasi-identifier and sensitive attributes.  
CAT3 – Streaming database anonymization.  
We then did a quality appraisal in terms of contributions with respect to the following areas:  
Q1 - Attribute categorization for high-dimensional or streaming datasets.  
Q2 - Adversary and privacy Models.  
Q3 - Anonymization techniques for high-dimensional datasets.  
Q4 - Anonymization techniques for streaming datasets.  
We scored the contribution of each paper on a scale of 3. “0” – No contribution, “1” – Some contribution, “2” – 
Major contribution to the research space. The total score shows how relevant the research is to our study.  
5. Data Extraction 
In this section we explain how we decided what pieces of information to extract from each paper under study. The 
result of the extraction process is summarized in Table 2.  In summary, only 3 of the papers present research work on 
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high-dimensional, relational databases usually associated with health data. Most studies focus on cross-sectional 
datasets with multiple sensitive attributes. There are 9 papers in this category and additional 5 that did not meet all 
our inclusion criteria. For streaming data anonymization, 6 papers were reviewed and an additional 2 also did not 
meet our inclusion criteria. 
Table 2. Selected Papers for Data Extraction 
Cat Paper Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total 
CAT 2 Abdalaal, et al. (2013)22  2 2 1 2 7 
CAT2 Aggarwal, C. C. (2008)23 1 2 2 0 7 
CAT 3 Byun, et al. (2006)24 2 2 1 2 9 
CAT2 El Emam & Dankar (2008)25 1 2 1 0 4 
CAT3 Fung, et al. (2012)26 2 2 0 1 6 
CAT2 Gal, et al. (2014)27 1 2 2 2 7 
CAT1 Ghinita, et al. (2008)28 2 2 0 2 6 
CAT2 Gkoulalas-Divanis, et al. (2014)29 2 2 2 1 8 
CAT2 Jändel (2014)30 1 2 1 1 5 
CAT3 Kim, et al. (2014)31 1 1 2 2 8 
CAT3 Mohammed, et al (2010)32 2 2 1 1 6 
CAT2 Mortazavi, et al (2014)33 1 1 2 1 5 
CAT1 Narayanan, et al (2008)34 1 2 2 1 6 
CAT1 Nergiz, et al (2009)35 0 1 2 2 4 
CAT2 Nergiz, et al (2014)36 1 2 2 2 7 
CAT3 Pei, et al (2007)37 0 1 0 1 4 
CAT2 Vatsalan, et al (2013)38  2 2 1 1 4 
CAT3 Yingjie, et al (2009)39   1 2 2 2 7 
6. Reporting the review 
In this section we provide a summary of the contributions and important remarks from the selected papers 
according to our four quality areas in section 5. 
6.1. Attribute categorization for high-dimensional or streaming datasets  
The curse of dimensionality is a problem associated with algorithms processing high-dimensional data. In 
anonymization, it occurs because there are many sensitive attributes making most anonymization algorithms 
computationally expensive with unacceptable levels of information loss. Aggarwal et al.23 show the effect of this 
curse with k-Anonymity, l-Diversity and other anonymization techniques using various theoretical models.  Abdalaal 
et al.22 show that little study has been done to anonymize multiple sensitive attributes such as those in opinion polls. 
Data Mashup techniques like those from Byun et al.26 require data from multiple providers to be aggregated before 
anonymization. This process results in an integrated dataset with too many sensitive attributes, making 
anonymization impossible as a result because of the curse of high dimensionality23. These datasets therefore become 
very vulnerable to attribute linkage attacks.  Based on these studies, we conclude that a successful high-dimensional 
health data anonymization framework needs to be able to handle multiple quasi-identifier and sensitive attributes.  
6.2. Adversary and Privacy Models 
As pointed out by Jandel30, modeling the adversary knowledge correctly provides good protection against de-
anonymization. Nergiz and Gok36 identify three classes of adversaries: 1) Classical adversaries that tries to discover 
sensitive attributes associated with an individual because of the knowledge of the quasi-identifier attributes. 2) 
Statistical adversaries that analyse the statistical distribution of the original and the anonymized datasets and 
discover perturbations to the data from variations in the distributions. 3) Algorithm-aware adversaries that know the 
algorithm used for anonymization and can reverse-engineer the process. 
For datasets with lots of quasi-identifiers, it is not realistic for the adversary to have knowledge of all the QI 
values. The LKC-privacy model proposed by Mohammed et al.32 bounds the numbers of QI values known to an 
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adversary to at most L values. The general intuition of this algorithm is to ensure that all combinations of L QI 
values will satisfy k-anonymity constraints and that the confidence of inferring any sensitive values in a sensitive 
attribute is not greater than a constant C. Unfortunately, combinatorics suffer from the curse of dimensionality23.  
Byun et al.24 pointed out that anonymized datasets are vulnerable to inference attacks when viewed collectively.  
The research further shows that the timeline between data releases could help an adversary re-identify some patients 
by analyzing the deltas between each batch and using those to pick-up sensitive attribute on patients from statically 
anonymized datasets. It is not uncommon for data publishers to anonymize and publish a sample of the original 
dataset. El Emam et al.25 show that for such scenarios, re-identification risk is dependent on the sample size. If there 
is no sampling, the adversary is certain that observed patients are in the published dataset and the maximum re-
identification risk is the same as 1/k. This is referred to as Prosecutor risk. However, if the data is sampled, an 
adversary only needs to show that there is at least an individual that can be re-identified in the anonymized dataset to 
discredit the publisher. This was the case with the 2006 Netflix Prize data34 breach. El Emam et al.25 call this 
Journalist risk.     
Finally, the systematic literature survey carried by Gkoulalas-Divanis et al.29 reviewed over 45 algorithms. While 
only a few of those focus on attribute disclosure, the paper points out that it is not clear if any of those algorithms 
would work in the healthcare setting because of the increasing complexity of health data. 
6.3. Anonymization Techniques for high-dimensional datasets 
Abdalaal et al. MSA-diversity22 is useful for statistical learning. It borrows from Hilbert curve anonymization40,41 
to increase utility of the anonymized dataset. Hilbert curve maps multi-dimensional quasi-identifier attributes to a 
flattened single dimension. It subsequently sorts the records according to their QI values and constructs sensitive 
attribute distinct groups of at least l tuples. There is need for further investigations on how this algorithm could be 
adapted to achieve l-diversity for datasets in relational form.  Algorithms like MiRaCle35 and Fast Data-Oriented 
Micro-aggregation (FDM)33 use clustering techniques that transform records into vector spaces. These vectors are 
subsequently processed to create k-Anonymous cluster groups. Unfortunately, clustering still suffers from high 
information loss with many quasi-identifiers23,34 and fails to protect against l-diversity. 
Gal et al.27 pointed out that implementing k-anonymity, l-diversity and t-Closeness in the same dataset leads to 
competing requirements, and subsequently considerable information loss through over generalization, perturbation 
and suppression. Their micro-aggregation algorithm targets numerical quasi-identifier attributes only in creating k-
Anonymous clusters while replacing sensitive attributes with masked values. SHARE introduced by Gkoulalas et 
al.29 tries to work around these competing requirements by creating two projections, one for the quasi-identifiers and 
the other for each sensitive attribute. It then identifies a group membership attribute that specifies the association 
between records in both projections. The problem is that it assumes only one sensitive attribute per dataset. It is also 
not known if these projections work with multiple sensitive attributes and quasi-identifiers. 
One of the important characteristics of high-dimensional datasets is sparseness especially with patients with long 
profiles. Correlation-aware Anonymization of High-dimensional Data (CAHD) introduced by Ghinita et al.28 targets 
relational datasets and take advantage of data sparseness to explore correlation among items. Correlated attributes 
form anonymous groups, drastically reducing the number of quasi-identifiers and sensitive attributes being 
considered for anonymization.  Unfortunately, the sensitive attributes are anonymized independently usually by 
seeding masked values. 
Narayanan and Shmatikov34 identify the need for a proper anonymization strategy for sparse high-dimensional 
dataset like the 2006 Netflix Prize data showing user movie ratings. Their de-anonymization algorithm Scoreboard-
RH adversarial attack tool exploits the facts that most records in a sparse database have little or no similarities. It 
also sees anonymization changes to a dataset as small "errors" or adversarial impression introduced, otherwise the 
utility of the dataset would be completely lost. This work also showed that Netflix Prize data was highly re-
identifiable because the sampling was not very random. They were successful in identifying Netflix records for 
known users and subsequently learnt about their political preferences and other potentially sensitive data in their 
profiles. This research shows that without proper anonymization, high-dimensional datasets are very vulnerable to 
de-anonymization. 
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6.4. Anonymization Techniques for streaming datasets 
Byun et al.24 show that with streaming anonymization, the dataset is continuously growing. So anonymization 
using static means is vulnerable to inference attacks.  This paper introduces an anonymization algorithm that inserts 
new records to anonymized dataset while ensuring data quality and protection against inference attacks. Byun et 
al.24, and Kim et al.31 propose an accumulation-based method for data stream anonymization. The frameworks pass 
each tuple through an aggregation engine that assigns each tuple to a cluster based on the information loss weight of 
its quasi-identifier. Every new tuple is moved to the cluster that results in the least information loss. Based on the 
cluster size, a tuple is either released immediately or kept for release at a later time. Clustering only considers the 
quasi-identifiers. For the sensitive attributes, they are released only after passing an l-diversity pre-condition. If they 
don't pass, perturbation takes place by seeding some randomly generated attributes to the original. 
Fung et al.26 tackles the problem of aggregating and anonymizing data mashups in a Service Oriented 
Architecture (SOA). This paper considers two approaches to integrating data. In the first approach, data is first 
mashed up before generalization (mashup-then-generalize) but the provider holding the mashup has access to 
sensitive attributes from other providers. The second approach is to generalize before mashup (generalize-then-
mashup) but this approach fails to guarantee anonymity when quasi-identifier values span multiple tables. 
7. Conclusions and Future Work  
Based on the papers reviewed, existing algorithms and frameworks touch various aspects of this problem but to 
claim full anonymization, a framework needs to touch all these aspects in one privacy model. Our findings show 
that: 1) It is probably impossible for an adversary to know the values of all quasi-identifiers in most high-
dimensional datasets. Therefore, adversarial knowledge needs to be bound as shown in LKC privacy32. Privacy 
models should account for these limits. 2) Clustering and micro-aggregation are good techniques for anonymizing 
high-dimensional datasets. However, they result in excessive information loss when there are too many quasi-
identifiers. They also fail to address l-Diversity on their own. 3) With high-dimensionality, there is sparseness and 
this aligns naturally to correlation. With correlation, as shown in Ghinita et al. algorithm28, one can reduce the 
number of quasi-identifiers and sensitive attributes that gets fed into an anonymization framework. 4) Aggarwal et 
al.23 show that multi-dimensional data in their natural forms suffer from dimensionality curse. Anonymization 
algorithms are prone to this curse when used in their natural forms for high-dimensional data. One of the 
recommended solutions is to transform this data to fewer and lower dimensions before anonymization. Algorithms 
like Hilbert curve 22 can be used for carrying out such transformations. 5) There is little work being done on 
suppression and local recoding despite their high utility. This is probably because of their complexity but would 
require further investigations. 6) There are good approaches for anonymizing streaming cross-sectional datasets that 
need be evaluated on larger datasets. One of the most important contributions from these papers 9,24,37,39 is that 
anonymization algorithms should use an accumulation based approach to support streaming data. This way, each 
data release process learns from transformations done in previous releases. 7) Finally, anonymization for health data 
sharing cannot be solved by technology alone. There is need to investigate regulatory frameworks that can 
complement technology to achieve the right mix of solution that allows health care organization to share data more 
efficiently and effectively. 
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